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This paper emphasizes the key roles that services play domestically and internationally in terms of 
accounting for rising shares of domestic output and employment as well as cross-border trade and foreign 
direct investment that provide enhanced export opportunities and lower-cost imports. Services are 
commonly subject to a variety of regulatory policies, such that liberalization requires both the removal of 
explicit barriers combined with regulatory reform.  There is substantial evidence indicating that services 
liberalization and regulatory reform may result in increased economic growth and greater efficiency in the 
use of labor and capital, increased product innovation, and increased consumer welfare. 
 
The role of services is put in context by a review of selected economic data on the trade and 
macroeconomic structure and performance especially of the five Andean economies – Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.  The implications of regulatory reform and services liberalization are 
analyzed in some depth, after which there is a focus on methods of measurement of international services 
barriers and quantification of the economic significance of reducing or removing these barriers.  The 
potential economic benefits of services liberalization are illustrated computationally.  The paper 
concludes with a discussion of priorities for multilateral services negotiations. 
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THE PLACE OF SERVICES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY* 
 
Robert M. Stern 
University of Michigan 
 
I. Introduction 
  In recent decades, attention has become increasingly focused on the key roles that services fulfill 
domestically and internationally.  It is widely recognized that services account for a significant and rising 
share of domestic output and employment, and that cross-border trade and foreign direct investment in 
services provide enhanced export opportunities for services suppliers and lower costs for imported 
services.  While it is sometimes thought that services rely primarily on unskilled workers, this is by no 
means the case since there are many services sectors in which there is substantial employment  of highly 
skilled workers. 
  Traditionally, services sectors have been subjected to a variety of domestic restraints that have 
limited entry of new services providers and discriminated against services provided by foreign producers.  
While many countries have unilaterally undertaken regulatory reform in many services sectors, it was not 
until the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-93) under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) that services liberalization was embodied in the multilateral negotiations with the 
signing of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  Many countries indicated their 
willingness to identify the services sectors that would be subject to liberalization, but actual negotiations 
were to be carried out at a later time.  While there have been international services negotiations completed 
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round covering financial services and telecommunications, 
comprehensive services liberalization is being addressed in the ongoing Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) negotiations that were launched in 2002 and are ongoing.  
    
*I wish to thank Gabriela Reyes for research assistance and Judith Jackson for typing and editorial 
assistance. 
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Services liberalization and regulatory reform are of great importance because of the effects that 
the measures may have in increasing the levels and rates of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and 
increasing employment.  There will also be improvements in economic efficiency as labor and capital are 
reallocated and firms respond to lower input prices and changing competitive conditions that will serve to 
reinforce the comparative advantage of different sectors.  Consumer welfare will be increased with 
reductions in the prices of goods and services and the availability of greater product variety.  In the longer 
run, there may be increased expenditures on research and development and innovations in production and 
the introduction of new products coupled with the fruits of greater capital formation from increased 
domestic and international investment. 
In order to place these introductory remarks in context, Section II that follows reviews some 
pertinent economic data on trade in goods and services globally and for the five Andean economies – 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela – together with some data on their macroeconomic 
structures and performance.  Section III provides more analytical depth to the implications of regulatory 
reform and liberalization of services, and Section IV focuses on methods of measurement of international 
services barriers and quantifying the economic significance of reducing or removing these barriers.  The 
potential economic benefits of services liberalization are illustrated computationally thereafter in Section 
V.  Section VI concludes with a discussion of priorities for multilateral services negotiations. 
II. Some Pertinent Economic Data 
Modes of Services Transactions 
The most distinguishing characteristic of services transactions is that their production and 
consumption occur simultaneously, although they can be provided in a variety of types or modes. There 
are four modes of services that can be distinguished.  These are 
•  Mode 1 – services that are traded internationally across borders 
•  Mode 2 – services that require the consumer to be in the location of the producer 
•  Mode 3 – services that require commercial presence in the form of foreign direct investment   4
•  Mode 4 – services that require the temporary cross-border movement of workers 
To clarify further, Mode 1 refers to “separated” services such as telecommunications, which are 
traded internationally across borders in a manner similar to cross-border trade in goods.  Here, foreign 
suppliers of a service provide it to domestic buyers through international means of communication and 
perhaps transportation, with a unit of the service itself often unobservable as it crosses national borders.  
A French telecoms company, for example, may provide telephone services to a customer in Colombia, in 
competition with a Colombian-based provider.  If a trade barrier exists in this case, it might consist of 
Colombian restrictions on the French firm’s access to phone lines in Colombia, discriminatory taxes on 
its operations, or regulations on the ways that Colombian consumers are allowed to access the foreign 
firm’s services.   
Mode 2 of services trade refers to services that require the consumer to be in the location of the 
producer, as in the cases of tourism and education.  Here again, the service provided is likely to be 
differentiated by the location or identify of the provider. 
Mode 3 of international services provision is arguably the most general and the most important:  
provision through a commercial presence that is the result of foreign direct investment (FDI).  Almost any 
service can be provided by firms from one country to consumers in another if the firms are allowed to 
establish a physical presence there.  This is true even of tourism – think of Euro-Disney for example. 
The final mode of supply, Mode 4, refers to the temporary cross-border movement of workers.  
Examples are the movement of computer programmers, engineers, management personnel, and lesser 
skilled construction workers who are granted temporary visas to work in a host country. Most movement 
that is actually permitted consists of workers within industries that produce traded goods or that produce 
services that are primarily thought of as traded through other modes.  Thus we do not think of many 
industries as producing services that are primarily traded through Mode 4.  On the other hand, labor itself 
is a service that could be traded in this way, and occasionally it has been, in the form of guest-worker 
programs and the like.     5
  An indication of the value of the four modes of services transactions is provided in Table 1.  It 
should be noted that the data for Modes 1, 2, and 4 are based on balance-of-payments accounts and 
Mode 3 on the gross output of foreign-owned affiliates.  The data are thus not really comparable, although 
they nonetheless give some indication of the relative importance of the various modes.  The relatively 
small proportion accounted for by compensation of employees may reflect the significant barriers that 
restrict Mode 4 movement of workers. 
Andean Economies Data 
  Aggregate data on exports and imports of merchandise and (cross-border) commercial services 
for the five Andean economies, Other Latin America, the United States, European Union (15), Japan, and 
Rest of World are indicated in Tables 2 and 3.  These data are measured in current prices for 1980, 1990, 
1995, and 2003.  For the Andean economies combined, aggregate exports of merchandise and commercial 
services increased in nominal terms by far less than the increases noted for the other countries and 
regions.  Aggregate services exports for the Andean economies were about 10% in value compared to 
their aggregate merchandise exports in 2003 and 27% for imports.  Globally, it can be seen that world 
services exports increased in nominal terms nearly 5-fold from 1980-2003 compared to under 4-fold for 
merchandise exports.  It is also evident that the Andean economies account for a relatively small 
percentage of total world exports of merchandise and services, 0.7% and 0.3%, respectively.  Tables 4-6 
contain data on the current values of trade in transportation services, travel services, and other 
commercial services for the selected years.  It can be seen that the Andean economies were net importers 
of transportation services and other commercial services and net exporters of travel services.   
  Data on total gross domestic product (GDP) in local currencies at constant prices and a 
breakdown by major producing sectors are noted in Table 7 for 1994 and 2003.  Total GDP increased in 
all of the Andean countries except for Venezuela.  Real GDP per capita increased in Bolivia and Peru, 
changed marginally in Colombia and Ecuador, and declined in Venezuela.  The share of agriculture in 
GDP fell noticeably in Ecuador and Venezuela.  The share of services exceeded 50% of GDP, with the   6
most noteworthy increases in Colombia and Ecuador.  The level of and changes in the population and 
labor force are given in Table 8.  All of the Andean countries noted, except Venezuela, have sizable 
proportions of rural population. 
  In table 9, there is an indication of the total stock of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
Andean economies for 2003.  Venezuela had by far the largest inward stock.  Some information is also 
given for the stock of U.S. FDI in total and broken down by major sector.  Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela 
have considerable U.S. FDI in mining and utilities.  The proportions of U.S. FDI in services were:   
Colombia, 46%; Ecuador, 34%; Peru, 44%; and Venezuela, 30%.  U.S. FDI data were not separately 
available for Bolivia. 
  The data presented in the foregoing tables are designed to provide a broad overview of the 
characteristics of the trade of the Andean economies and aspects of their macroeconomic, demographic, 
and sectoral structure.  To obtain a more complete picture of these economies would require 
disaggregated data, but space constraints preclude this.  We turn next then to focus explicitly on services 
issues. 
III. Regulatory Reform and Liberalization of Services 
  Mention has already been made of the rationale for undertaking regulatory reform and 
liberalization of services.  In this connection, Mattoo (2003, pp. 3-6) has called attention to the benefits 
involved: 
“There are strong intuitive reasons to believe that services trade liberalization, 
implemented in the context of a broader services reform program, has profound effects on 
overall economic performance…. 
 
•  Dynamic benefits 
 
Certain services industries clearly possess growth generating characteristics, given the 
central role that the financial services play in the transformation of savings to investment, 
telecommunications in the diffusion of knowledge, transport to a country’s ability to 
participate in global trade, education and health services in building up the stock of 
human capital, and business services in reducing transactions costs.  Furthermore, 
barriers to entry in a number of services sectors, ranging from telecommunications to 
professional services, are maintained not only against foreign suppliers but also against   7
new domestic and foreign suppliers.  Greater foreign factor participation and increased 
competition together imply a larger scale of activity, and hence greater scope for 
generating the special growth-enhancing effects.  Even without scale effects, the import 
of foreign factors that characterizes services sector liberalization could still have positive 
effects because they are likely to bring technology with them.  If greater technology 
transfer accompanies services liberalization – either embodied in foreign direct 
investment or disembodied – the growth effect will be stronger.  …. 
 
•  Impact on comparative advantage 
 
Reform of services policy has an impact not only on overall economic activity but also on 
its composition.  The profound effect transport costs have on trade and the distribution of 
economic activity across regions is increasingly well-documented.  …international 
variations in communications costs…have a significant influence on trade patterns…and 
can shift a country’s comparative advantage towards more sophisticated communication-
intensive differentiated goods and away from more standardized primary goods. 
 
  These benefits cannot be realized by a mechanical opening up of services 
markets and the gains from liberalization can be undermined by a flawed reform 
program. 
 
  Most people would today agree on certain conditions for successful reform.  We 
know that in services ranging from telecommunications to transport larger benefits come 
from introducing meaningful competition rather than simply allowing a change of 
ownership from public to private or from national to foreign hands.  For example, if 
privatization of state monopolies to private owners (sometimes foreigners) is conducted 
without concern to creating conditions of competition, the result may be merely transfers 
of monopoly rents to private owners.  Similarly, if increased entry into financial sectors is 
not accompanied by adequate prudential supervision and greater competition, the result 
may be insider lending and poor investment decisions.  Also, if policies to ensure 
universal service are not put into place, liberalization need not improve access to essential 
services for the poor.  Managing reforms of services markets therefore requires 
integrating trade opening with a careful combination of competition and regulation. 
 
  [Further,] … impact of reform depends both on the combination and sequencing 
of policies.  …. 
 
  But even now there is a lot that we do not know… 
 
  Consider several questions that policy makers and negotiators must address.  In 
financial services, how far should trade and investment liberalization be conditioned on 
strengthened prudential regulation?  In basic telecommunications and other services 
subject to economies of scale, is the conceptual case for limiting the number of suppliers 
invalidated by experience?  How much is to be gained by eliminating all barriers to entry 
when some competition has already been allowed?  How great are the gains from 
eliminating all barriers to foreign investment when some is already permitted?  How 
large are the adjustment costs associated with different modes of supply?  In virtually 
every service sector, would liberalization improve access to essential services for the 
poor, and if not, what must be done?”   8
  It should be clear from the foregoing excerpts that regulatory reform combined with the 
liberalization of barriers in services industries may generate important dynamic growth benefits and 
improvements in comparative advantage in the production and trade of countries’ goods and services 
industries.  There are considerable gains in economic welfare that may result therefore if regulatory 
reform and liberalization of services barriers can be carried out.  In order to realize these gains, a 
prerequisite is to assemble information about existing services barriers and to devise methodologies to 
estimate what the economic effects would be if the barriers were reduced or eliminated altogether.  We 
turn next accordingly to discuss issues of the measurement and modeling of services barriers. 
IV. Measurement and Modeling of the Economic Effects of Services Barriers 
  For all of the modes of services transactions, the primary objective of empirical measurement is 
to deduce some sort of tariff equivalent of the barrier to trade in particular services.  Since direct price 
comparisons seldom serve that purpose, however, researchers have pursued other means of inferring the 
presence and size of barriers to trade.  Some of these have been quite direct:  they simply ask 
governments or participants in markets what barriers they impose or face.  The answers are usually only 
qualitative, indicating the presence or absence of a particular type of barrier, but not its quantitative size 
or effect.  Such qualitative information takes on a quantitative dimension, however, when it is tabulated 
by sector, perhaps with subjective weights to indicate severity.  The result is a set of “frequency 
measures” of barriers to trade, recording what the barriers are and where, and perhaps also the fraction of 
trade within a sector or country that is subject to them.  Frequency measures do not directly imply 
anything like the tariff equivalents of trade barriers, but in order to use them for quantitative analysis, 
analysts have often converted them to that form in rather ad hoc ways that will be indicated below. 
Other, more indirect, measurements of trade barriers in service industries have also been used, 
alone or in combination with frequency measures.  These may be divided into two types:  measurements 
that use information about prices and/or costs and measurements that observe quantities of trade or 
production and attempt to infer how trade barriers have affected these quantities.  In both cases, as will be   9
discussed, if one can also measure or assume an appropriate elasticity reflecting the response of quantity 
to price, a measured effect on either can be translated into an effect on the other. Thus both price and 
quantity measurements are also often converted into, and reported as, tariff equivalents. 
Because service industries have numerous special features, both in the ways that they operate and 
in their amenability to measurement, empirical work is therefore essential to address the measurement of 
the various services barriers that impede international services transactions.   
Characteristics of Services Barriers 
  As noted by Hoekman and Primo Braga (1997, p. 288), border measures such as tariffs are 
generally difficult to apply to services because customs agents cannot readily observe services as they 
cross the border.  It is also the case that many services are provided in the country of consumption rather 
than cross-border.  Typically, therefore, services restrictions are designed in the form of government 
regulations applied to the different modes of services transactions.   
Thus, for example, these regulations may affect the entry and operations of both domestic and 
foreign suppliers of services and in turn increase the price or the cost of the services involved.  Services 
barriers are therefore more akin to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) than to tariffs, and their impact will depend 
on how the government regulation is designed and administered.  In this connection, the Australian 
Productivity Commission distinguishes the government regulations of services along two dimensions, 
according to whether restrictions are:
1 
•  “imposed on establishment or ongoing operations; and 
•  non-discriminatory (treat domestic and foreign service suppliers equally) or discriminatory (treat 
foreign service suppliers differently from (typically less favorably than) domestic suppliers).” 
Existing regulations differ greatly across service industries and are often based on characteristics 
of the particular service being provided.  This can be illustrated using the case of banking services based 
                                                 
1For more details, see the website of the Australian Productivity Commission 
(www.pc.gov.au/research/memoranda/servicesrestriction/index.html).  See also Hoekman and Braga (1997, p. 288), 
who classify and provide examples of services barriers as follows:  (1) quotas, local content, and prohibitions; (2) 
price-based instruments; (3) standards, licensing, and procurement; and (4) discriminatory access to distribution 
networks.   10
on a study by McGuire and Schuele (2000) done under the auspices of the Australian Productivity 
Commission.  Table 10 lists groupings of restrictions that apply especially to Modes 3 and 4 of 
international banking services transactions.  These restrictions relate to commercial presence and “other 
restrictions” applied to banking services, together with a brief indication of what these restrictions 
represent and how an index of them has been constructed.
2  As McGuire and Schuele note (p. 206):  “The 
commercial presence grouping covers restrictions on licensing, direct investment, joint venture 
arrangements, and the permanent movement of people.  The ‘other restrictions’ grouping covers 
restrictions on raising funds, lending funds, providing other lines of business (insurance and securities 
services), expanding banking outlets, the composition of the board of directors and the temporary 
movement of people.”  An indication of the restrictiveness of these regulations is also provided in the 
table and will be discussed below.   
Another perspective on the types of barriers affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) (Mode 3), 
in establishing a commercial presence in many sectors in host countries, is provided by Hardin and 
Holmes (1997).  They define (p. 24) an FDI barrier as “…any government policy measure which distorts 
decisions about where to invest and in what form.”  In considering ways of classifying FDI barriers, they 
note (pp. 33-34): 
“The appropriate classification system may vary, depending on the purpose of the 
exercise. For example, if the purpose is to check and monitor compliance with some 
policy commitment, then the categories should reflect the key element of the 
commitment…. If the primary interest is instead the resource allocation implications of 
the barriers, some additional or different information may be useful. 
 
Barriers to FDI may distort international patterns and modes of…trade. They may also 
distort allocation of capital between different economies, between foreign and domestic 
investment, between different sectors, and between portfolio and direct investment. …the 
classification system…should highlight the key characteristics of the barriers that will 
determine their size and impact. Market access and national treatment are…relevant 
categories from a resource allocation perspective. …national treatment is generally taken 
to refer to measures affecting firms after establishment. A…way to classify barriers is 
therefore…according to what aspect of the investment they most affect: establishment, 
ownership and control; or operations. In addition…, some further information may be 
                                                 
2 See the Productivity Commission website for detailed listings by country of the categories of domestic and 
foreign restrictions on establishment and ongoing operations for some selected services sectors, including:   
accountancy, architectural, and engineering services; banking; distribution; and maritime services.     11
useful…on distinctions…between direct versus indirect restrictions on foreign controlled 
firms; and rules versus case-by-case decisions.”
3 
  The main types of FDI barriers that have been identified by UNCTAD (1996) are noted in 
Table 11.  Further information on the barriers most commonly used to restrict FDI especially in the APEC 
economies is provided in Hardin and Holmes (1997, esp. pp. 37-40 and 45-55). As they note (p. 40), 
some common characteristics appear to be:
4 
“application of some form of screening or registration process involving various degrees 
of burden for the foreign investor; restrictions on the level or share of foreign ownership, 
particularly in some service sectors, and often in the context of privatisations; widespread 
use of case-by-case judgments, often based on national interest criteria; widespread use 
of restrictions on ownership and control (e.g., restrictions on board membership), 
particularly in sectors such as telecommunications, broadcasting, banking; and relatively 
limited use of performance requirements on input controls in services sectors.” 
  It is evident from the foregoing discussion that services barriers exist in a variety of forms, 
depending on the types of services involved, the country imposing the barriers, and the sectors to which 
the barriers are applied.  To help further the understanding of the different services barriers, it would be 
useful if the available information by country and sector were organized according to the four modes of 
international services transactions and whether or not they are protectionist in intent.  As already noted, 
these modes cover:  cross-border services (Mode 1); consumption abroad (Mode 2); FDI (Mode 3); and 
the temporary movement of workers (Mode 4).  Using this information, the next and difficult step is to 
devise methods of measurement of the various barriers and to integrate these measures within a 
framework designed to assess their economic effects. 
Methods of Measurement of Services Barriers 
Measurements of trade barriers, in markets for both goods and services, can be either direct or 
indirect.  Direct measurements start from the observation of an explicit policy or practice, such as an 
                                                 
3 Direct restrictions include limitations on the total size or share of investment in a sector and requirements on 
inputs used (e.g., local content).  Indirect restrictions include net benefit or national interest criteria and limitations 
on membership of company boards.  The distinction between rules and case-by-case decisions relates to issues of 
clarity in specification and transparency as compared to the exercise of administrative discretion. 
4 Hardin and Holmes (pp. 40-43) also provide information on investment incentives, which are widely used and 
for the most part are not subject to multilateral disciplines.   12
import quota or a regulation of a foreign provider of services, and then attempt in some fashion to 
measure its economic importance.  Indirect measurements try instead to infer the existence of barriers 
using observed discrepancies between actual economic performance and what would be expected if trade 
were free.  Direct measurements have the advantage that one knows what one is measuring, and the 
disadvantage that they can only include those barriers that are in fact explicit and recognized.  Indirect 
measurements have the advantage that their quantitative importance is known, at least in the dimension 
used to identify them, but the disadvantage that they may incorporate unrecognized frictions other than 
the policy impediments that one seeks to identify. 
  With respect to the barriers applied in the case of trade in goods, direct measurements of the 
barriers typically take the form of inventories of identified trade restrictions, such as those compiled in the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) TRade Analysis and INformation 
System (TRAINS).
5  Since barriers usually cover only some industries or products, a first step in 
quantifying them is often to measure the fraction of trade that they cover in different sectors and 
countries.  These fractions may then be used directly in empirical work, even though they do not 
themselves say anything about how effective the barriers have been in restricting trade.
6  Indirect 
measurements, on the other hand, can be fairly straightforward, based either on the observed prices of 
goods before and after they cross an international border or on the quantities that cross it.  For example, 
one can often infer both the presence of an import barrier and its effect on price by simply comparing the 
price of a good inside a country to that outside, since in the absence of any barrier one would expect 
competitive market forces to cause these prices to be the same.  Indirect measurements based on 
quantities are more difficult to apply, however, since they depend on a theoretical benchmark for 
comparability that is likely to be much less certain.   
  For trade in services, direct measurements must be carefully done, since regulation in service 
industries is so widespread that merely to document its presence would not be informative.  A common 
                                                 
5 TRAINS is available on-line at www.unctad.org. 
6 In fact, they are somewhat perverse for this purpose, since the more restrictive is an NTB, the less will be the 
trade that it permits.   13
approach is therefore to complement the documentation of regulations by incorporating information about 
the restrictiveness of the regulations, and then use this information to construct an index of restrictiveness 
that can be compared across countries 
  Indirect measurements of restrictiveness are also possible with traded services, although it will 
usually be difficult to compare prices inside and outside a country. This is because many services are 
differentiated by location in a way that renders price comparisons meaningless for the most part.  For 
example, the cost of providing telephone service to consumers on the Texas side of the U.S.-Mexican 
border need bear no particular relationship to the cost, for the same firm, of providing it across the border 
in Mexico, where wages are much lower but costs of infrastructure may be much higher.  So even if trade 
in the service were completely unimpeded, we would not expect these prices to be the same.  It may 
therefore not be possible to infer a trade barrier in either direction.  Similar arguments can be made about 
most traded services. 
  Indirect measurements of barriers to trade in services are therefore less common than for trade in 
goods, although they do exist.  As will be discussed below, there has been some success using the so-
called gravity models as a benchmark for quantities of trade in services, and the results of these models 
have therefore been the basis for indirect measurement of barriers in the quantity dimension.  Financial 
data have also been the basis for inferring barriers from differences in the markups of price over cost, as 
will also be discussed. 
  Because of the difficulty with indirect measurements of services barriers, there is a need for some 
other approach to quantifying the effects of barriers that have been identified.  In this connection, indexes 
of restrictiveness can be constructed that are typically measured on a scale of zero to one.  But since it 
cannot be determined by how much a barrier either raises price or reduces quantity, it may be possible to 
use econometric analysis to relate an index of restrictiveness to observed prices or quantities, thereby 
translating the measures of the presence of barriers into an estimate of their economic effect in particular 
services markets.   14
  In what follows, then, I first discuss the construction of measures of the presence of barriers, 
commonly referred to as frequency-based measurements, and the use of these measurements to construct 
indexes of restrictiveness.  This is followed by a discussion of how the effects on prices and quantities can 
be derived.  I then turn to methods that attempt to infer the presence of services barriers indirectly, first 
from a gravity model of the quantities of trade, and second from financial data within service firms. 
Frequency Studies and Indexes of Restrictiveness 
  Studies of frequency-based measures start by identifying the kinds of restriction that apply to a 
particular service industry or to services in general.  For particular industries, this requires considerable 
industry-specific knowledge, since each industry has, at a minimum, its own terminology, and commonly 
also its own distinctive reasons for regulatory concern.  Regulations often serve an ostensibly valid 
purpose – protecting health and safety, for example – and knowledge of the industry is necessary to 
distinguish such valid regulations from those that primarily offer protection.  Thus, a frequency study is 
best carried out by an industry specialist, or it must draw upon documents that have been prepared by 
such specialists.  Industry studies therefore typically build upon the documentation provided by industry 
trade groups, as for example the International Telecommunications Union in the case of telecoms, 
bilateral air service arrangements in the case of passenger air travel, or the TradePort website in the case 
of maritime services. 
  For broader studies of restrictions in services, covering multiple industries, some source must be 
found that incorporates such expertise across sectors.  An early approach to doing this was in studies that  
used information that countries had submitted to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), to 
be used as the basis for commitments to be made for services liberalization in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  Such measures are therefore not ideally suited for documenting trade barriers.  Better 
information requires that someone deliberately collect the details of actual barriers and regulatory 
practices, as in the data collected by Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and used by Hardin and 
Holmes (1997).  In all cases, the goal is not just to assemble a complete list of barriers, but also to know   15
the restrictiveness of these barriers in terms such as the numbers of firms or countries to which they apply 
and other characteristics.  This latter information is then used to construct an Index of Restrictiveness.  
Typically, each barrier is assigned a score between zero and one, with a score of one being the most 
restrictive and a score of zero being the least restrictive.  These scores are then averaged, using weights 
that are intended to reflect the relative importance of each type of barrier. 
  There are several ways in which the weights on different barriers in a restrictiveness index may 
be assigned.  Most commonly, these reflect the judgments of knowledgeable investigators as to the 
importance of each type of barrier.  This may well be the best approach if the investigator really is 
knowledgeable, as in the case when an index is being constructed for a specific, narrowly defined 
industry.  An alternative that has been used by Nicoletti et al. (2000) and subsequently by Doove et al. 
(2001) is to use a statistical methodology to distinguish those barriers that vary most independently 
among their data, and then to apply the largest weights to them.  This purely statistical methodology is not 
however an improvement on the use of judgmental weights. 
  A third approach is not to construct an index at all, but rather to use the scores or proxy measures 
for each barrier separately in an empirical analysis.  The difficulty here is that these scores may be 
interrelated, so that their independent influence on any variable of interest may be impossible to ascertain 
using standard statistical methods.  If this can be done, however, the advantage is that it allows for the fact 
that barriers may differ in their importance for different aspects of economic performance, and this 
approach allows these differences to become known.  Ideally, one would prefer an approach that allows 
the weights in an index of restrictiveness to be estimated simultaneously with the importance of that index 
for a particular economic outcome.  Thus the construction of the index would be interlinked with its use 
for estimating effects on prices and quantities. 
  To continue with the example of restriction categories and weights applied to banking services in 
the study by McGuire and Schuele (2000) noted in Table 10 above, these authors have assigned scores for 
different degrees of restriction, ranging between 0 (least restrictive) and 1 (most restrictive).  The various 
categories are weighted judgmentally in terms of how great the costs involved are assumed to be with   16
respect to the effect on economic efficiency.  Thus, it can be seen in Table 10 that restrictions on the 
licensing of banks are taken to be more burdensome than restrictions on the movement of people.  Also, 
the scores are given separately for the restrictions applicable only to foreign banks and the “domestic” 
restrictions applicable to all banks.  The differences between the foreign and domestic measures can then 
be interpreted as indicating the discrimination imposed on foreign banks.  Finally, it will be noted that the 
foreign scores sum to a maximum of 1 and the domestic scores to a maximum of 0.808, because some of 
the restrictions noted apply only to foreign banks and not to domestic banks.  
Based on detailed information available, the scores for banking restrictions in individual countries 
can be constructed.  Using the category weights in Table 10, it is then possible to calculate “indexes of 
restrictiveness” of the foreign and domestic regulations by country.  These indexes are depicted 
graphically for selected Asia-Pacific countries, South Africa, and Turkey in Figure 1 and for Western 
Hemisphere countries in Figure 2.  India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines can be seen to have 
relatively high foreign index scores, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Turkey have moderate foreign index 
scores, and Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, and South Africa have the lowest foreign index 
scores.  The domestic index scores are indicative of the restrictions applied both to domestic and foreign 
banks, and it appears that the domestic index scores are highest for Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines.   
While the absolute values of the foreign and domestic index scores are not reported, the 
differences in the scores can be interpreted visually as a measurement of the discrimination applied to 
foreign banks.  Thus, in Figure 1, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Turkey appear to have the highest discrimination against foreign banks.  In Figure 2, Brazil, Chile, 
and Uruguay have the highest foreign index scores, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela have moderate 
scores, and Argentina, Canada, and the United States have the lowest scores.  Chile and Uruguay have the 
highest domestic index scores, while Argentina, Canada, Mexico, the United States, and Venezuela have 
domestic index scores of zero.  Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay have the most discriminatory regimes   17
against foreign banks.
7  McGuire and Schuele (2000, pp. 212-13) further found that countries with less 
restricted banking sectors tended to have higher GNP per capita. 
  The frequency measures and indexes of restriction discussed thus far are especially useful in 
identifying the types of barriers and the relative degree of protection afforded to particular services 
sectors across countries.  Deardorff and Stern (2004, Appendix 1) review a number of other studies that 
are based on measurements of this type and note that there exists a considerable amount of information on 
barriers covering a wide variety of services sectors, including financial services, telecommunications, 
accountancy, distribution, air transport, and electricity supply.  As such, the construction of such 
measurements and indexes is an important first step that can provide the basis for the next step, which 




  As discussed above, the nature of services tends to prevent the use of their differences across 
borders to measure their presence or size.  Therefore, in order to construct measurements of the price 
and/or quantity effects of barriers to trade in services, some other approach is needed. 
The simplest is just to make an informed guess.  For example, having constructed a frequency 
ratio for offers to liberalize services trade in the GATS as discussed above, Hoekman (1995,1996) 
constructed weighted average measurements by sector and country.  These “guesstimates” for 1-digit 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) sectors for selected countries are indicated in 
Table 12.  It can be seen that the tariff equivalents are highest for ISIC 7, Transportation, Storage & 
Communication, reflecting the significant constraints applied within this sector.  There is also 
considerable variation within the individual sectors for the relatively highly industrialized countries listed 
in Table 12.  These measurements are designed to indicate only the relative degree of restriction and 
                                                 
7 The detailed scores for the components of the domestic and foreign banking restrictions are broken down by 
individual countries and are available on the Productivity Commission website. 
8See Bosworth, Findlay, Trewin, and Warren (2000) for a useful methodological discussion of the construction 
and interpretation of price-impact measurements of impediments to services trade.   18
should not be taken literally as indicators of absolute ad valorem tariff equivalents.  That is, the tariff 
equivalent benchmarks are just judgmental and are not distinguished according to their economic impact.   
An improved approach that has been used in more recent studies is to combine other data together 
with an index or proxy measures of restrictiveness in order to estimate econometrically the effects of 
barriers.  For example, suppose that an index of restrictiveness has been constructed for a group of 
countries, and that price data are also available for the services involved in this same group.  Using 
knowledge and data on the economic determinants of these prices, an econometric model can be 
formulated to explain them.  Then, if the restrictiveness index and/or proxy measures of restrictiveness 
are included, the estimated coefficient(s) will measure the effect of the trade restrictions on prices, 
controlling for the other determinants of prices that have been included in the model. 
Use of this method of course requires data on more than just the barriers themselves, including 
prices and other relevant determinants of prices.  However, these additional data may be needed for only a 
subset of the countries for which the restrictiveness measures have been constructed, so long as one can 
assume that the effects of restrictions may be common across countries.  The coefficients relating 
restrictiveness to prices can be estimated for a subset of countries for which the requisite data are 
available, and the estimated coefficients can then be applied to the other countries as well.  Examples of 
this approach are provided in Deardorff and Stern (2004, Appendix 1), covering several sectors, including 
international air services, wholesale and retail food distributors, banks, maritime services, engineering 
services, telecommunications, and industrial electricity supply in both developed and developing 
countries.  These various sectors are evidently distinctive in terms of their economic characteristics and 
the regulatory measures that affect their operations.  Specialized knowledge of the sectors is thus essential 
in designing the conceptual framework and adapting the available data to calculate the price impacts of 
the regulatory measures involved.   19
Quantity-Impact Measurements 
Another approach, appropriate for some service industries, is to model the determination of 
quantity rather than price, and then include the trade restrictiveness index as a variable to estimate the 
effects of trade barriers on quantities.  This approach has been used by Warren (2000) in assessing the 
quantitative impact of barriers in telecommunications services, chiefly mobile telephony and fixed 
network services, for 136 countries. His estimates of the tariff equivalents for domestic and for foreign 
providers of telecommunication services in the major nations are shown in Table 13.  The estimates for 
the advanced industrialized countries are relatively low in comparison to the much higher estimates for 
the newly industrializing countries shown.  There are cases of developing countries (not shown) that in 
some cases have very large tariff equivalents, including some with several hundred percent, e.g., China 
(804 and 1,000 percent), Colombia (11 percent and 24 percent), India (861 and 1,000 percent), Indonesia 
(71 and 128 percent), South Africa (14 and 21 percent), and Venezuela (10 and 15 percent). 
Gravity-Model Estimates 
  Because the modeling of prices that is needed to estimate a price effect is necessarily very sector 
specific, the techniques described so far have limited use for quantifying barriers across sectors.   
Likewise, they are not useful for comparing the overall levels of service trade barriers across countries.  
For that, one needs a more general model of trade to use as a benchmark, and a choice available is the so-
called gravity model, which relates bilateral trade volumes positively to the incomes of both trading 
partners and negatively to the distance between them.  It has become a very popular tool in recent years 
for eliciting the effects of a wide variety of policy and structural influences on trade in a manner that 
controls for the obvious importance of income and distance. 
  Francois (1999) has fit a gravity model to bilateral services trade for the United States and its 
major trading partners, taking Hong Kong and Singapore to be free trade benchmarks.  He took the 
differences between actual and predicted imports to be indicative of trade barriers and normalized them 
relative to the free trade benchmarks for Hong Kong and Singapore.  His results for business/financial   20
services and for construction are indicated in Table 14.  Brazil has the highest estimated tariff equivalent 
for business/financial services (35.7 percent), followed by Japan, China, Other South Asia, and Turkey at 
about 20 percent.  The estimated tariff equivalents are considerably higher for construction services, in 
the 40-60 percent range for China, South Asia, Brazil, Turkey, Central Europe, Russia, and South Africa, 
and in the 10-30 percent range for the industrialized countries.  Deardorff and Stern (2004, Appendix 1) 
discuss the limitations of the use and interpretation of gravity models, stressing that these models may 
overstate the effects of the barriers being measured and are not well suited for application for sectoral 
analysis. 
Financial-Based Measurements 
  Hoekman (2000) has suggested that financial data on gross operating margins calculated by 
sector and country may provide information about the effects of government policies on firm entry and 
conditions of competition.
9  As he notes (p. 36): 
“In general, a large number of factors will determine the ability of firms to generate high 
margins, including market size (number of firms), the business cycle, the state of 
competition policy enforcement, the substitutability of products, fixed costs, etc.   
Notwithstanding the impossibility of inferring that high margins are due to high barriers, 
there should be a correlation between the two across countries for any given sector.  Data 
on operating margins provide some sense of the relative profitability of activities, and 
therefore, the relative magnitude (restrictiveness) of barriers to entry/exit that may exist.” 
The country-region results of Hoekman’s analysis, averaged over firms and sectors for 1994-96, 
are indicated for agriculture, manufacturing, and services in Table 15.  Sectoral results for services only 
are given in Table 16.  Services margins are generally higher than manufacturing margins by 10-15 
percentage points, and the services margins vary considerably across countries.  Australia, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore have the lowest services margins – in the neighborhood of 20 percent – while Chile, China, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States have services margins in excess of 40 
percent.  The sectoral results indicate that the margins for hotels and financial services are relatively high, 
                                                 
9Gross operating margins are defined as total sales revenue minus total average costs divided by total average 
costs.   21
and the margins for wholesale and retail trade are lower.  The margins for several developing countries 
appear to be relatively high in a number of sectors.  Overall, as Hoekman suggests (p. 39): 
“…business services, consultancy, and distribution do not appear to be among the most 
protected sectors. …barriers to competition are higher in transportation, finance, and 
telecommunications.  These are also basic ‘backbone’ imports that are crucial for the 
ability of enterprises to compete internationally.” 
V. Measuring the Economic Consequences of Liberalizing Services Barriers 
While the various measurements of services barriers that have been reviewed are of interest in 
themselves, they need to be incorporated into an explicit economic modeling framework in order to 
determine how the existence or removal of the barriers will affect conditions of competition, productivity, 
the allocation of resources, and economic welfare within or between sectors and countries.  In this regard, 
a modeling framework can be devised for individual sectors or on an economy-wide basis using 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling. 
Sectoral Modeling 
An example of sectoral modeling is provided by Fink, Mattoo, and Rathindram (2003), who 
analyze the impact of policy reform on sectoral performance in basic telecommunications.  Their data 
cover 86 developing countries globally for the period, 1985-1999.  They address three questions, covering 
the impact of:  (1) policy changes relating to ownership, competition, and regulation; (2) any one policy 
reform coupled with the implementation of complementary reforms; and (3) the sequencing of reforms. 
Their findings are:  (1) privatization and the introduction of competition significantly increase 
labor productivity and the density of telecommunication mainlines; (2) privatization and competition 
work best through their interactions; and (3) there are more favorable effects from introducing 
competition before privatization.  They further conclude that autonomous technological progress 
outweighs the effects of policy reforms in increasing the growth of teledensity. 
What is especially noteworthy about this type of study is its focus on both the policy and market 
structure of the sector and the econometric framework that is designed to measure the determinants of   22
teledensity and telecommunications productivity.  The assessment of particular services barriers may 
therefore be most effectively addressed when incorporated into a sectoral modeling framework.
10 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Modeling 
In contrast to sectoral modeling, CGE modeling provides a framework for multi-sectoral and 
multi-country analysis of the economy-wide effects of services barriers and related policies.  Most CGE 
modeling research to date has been focused on barriers to international trade in goods rather than trade in 
services and FDI.  The reasons for this stem in large part from the lack of comprehensive data on cross-
border services trade and FDI and the associated barriers, together with the difficult conceptual problems 
of modeling that are encountered.  Some indication of pertinent CGE modeling work relating to services 
is provided in Hardin and Holmes (1997, p. 85), Brown and Stern (2001, pp. 272-74), and Stern (2002, 
pp. 254-56).  The approaches to modeling can be divided as follows:  (1) analysis of cross-border services 
trade liberalization in response to reductions in services barriers; (2) modeling in which FDI is assumed to 
result from trade liberalization or other changes that generate international capital flows in the form of 
FDI in response to changes in rates of return; and (3) modeling of links between multinational 
corporations’ (MNCs) parents and affiliates and distinctions between foreign and domestic firms in a 
given country/region. 
For our purposes here, it useful to cite the results based on the first of the three modeling 
approaches noted, namely analyzing the effects of reductions in services barriers on the cross-border trade 
in services.  In this connection, the present author has collaborated with Alan Deardorff (University of 
Michigan) since the early 1970s and with Drusilla Brown (Tufts University) since the mid-1980s in 
developing the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. This is a computer-based model that has 
been used to study a variety of important policy issues such as the effects of the GATT/WTO multilateral 
                                                 
10 See also Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu (2002) and Deardorff and Stern (2004, Appendix 1) for discussion of a study of 
the importance of restrictive trade policies and private anti-competitive practices relating to international maritime 
services.   23
trade negotiations, changes in the structure of protection, trade and employment,  and the effects of 
preferential trading arrangements.   
Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2005) have used the Michigan Model to evaluate the economic effects 
of the U.S. free trade arrangements (FTAs) negotiated with Central America (CAC), Australia, and 
Morocco as well as unilateral removal of existing trade barriers by the countries involved in the FTAs, 
and global (multilateral) free trade in which all of the major trading countries/regions completely remove 
all of their trade barriers.  The analysis utilizes available tariff data for trade in agricultural products and 
manufactures and specially constructed estimates of services barriers based on Hoekman’s financial-
based measures noted in Tables 15 and 16.  The results are indicated in Table 17 and can be summarized 
as follows:  
1.  Global free trade increases U.S. economic welfare by $543 billion (5.4% of GNP). This is 
greater than the $320 billion increase in U.S. economic welfare resulting from U.S. unilateral 
free trade.  With global free trade, economic welfare rises by $2.4 trillion. The components of 
the increases in welfare from global free trade are $54 billion for agriculture, $702 billion for 
manufactures, and $1.7 trillion for services.  These welfare increases greatly exceed the 
increases associated with the U.S. bilateral FTAs. 
2.  With global free trade, CAC economic welfare increases by $18 billion (15% of GNP), as 
compared to a welfare increase of $6.2 billion for unilateral free trade and $5.3 billion for 
CAFTA. 
3.  With global free trade, Australia’s economic welfare increases by $30 billion (6% of GNP).  
This compares to a welfare increase of $4.6 billion with unilateral free trade for Australia and 
$5.4 billion for the U.S.-Australia FTA. 
4.  With global free trade, Morocco’s economic welfare increases by $5 billion (11% of GNP) as 
compared to $1.6 billion for unilateral free trade and $0.9 billion for the U.S.-Morocco FTA. 
What is striking about these results is that services liberalization offers by far much greater 
potential increases in economic welfare as compared to agricultural and manufactures liberalization.  This 
reflects the higher services barriers that have been calculated in comparison to the barriers involved in 
agriculture and manufactures trade.  These computational results thus provide the rationale for pursuing 
services liberalization in the context of the ongoing Doha Development Agenda negotiations under WTO 
auspices.   24
A similar conclusion comes from the third type of modeling study noted that attempts to capture 
the important role played especially by MNCs and their foreign affiliates in providing Mode 3-type 
services.  This is the focus of the study by Brown and Stern (2001), some details of which are presented 
in Deardorff and Stern (2004, Appendix 1).  Brown and Stern analyze the effects of removal of services 
barriers under alternative conditions of international capital mobility and changes in the world capital 
stock due to increased investment.  Their results suggest that the welfare effects of removing services 
barriers are sizable and vary across countries depending on how international capital movements and 
changes in domestic investment respond to changes in rates of return.  The largest potential benefits are 
realized for all of the major developed and developing countries when allowance is made for changes in 
investment that augment the stock of capital. 
VI. Priorities for Services Negotiations 
Mattoo (2003, pp. 13-16) offers some useful suggestions in devising priorities for services 
liberalization in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations, especially from the perspective of 
developing countries:: 
•  “Multilateral negotiations can help deliver both domestic reform and improved access.  
But several conditions must be fulfilled. 
…The challenge is to ensure that international commitments reflect good economic policy 
rather than the dictates of political economy or negotiating pressure.  An informed judgment 
will require a thorough analysis of the implications of, and rationale for, the existing barriers.  
In particular, it is essential to distinguish between the areas where liberalization is prevented 
solely by the political power of vested interests – to which the WTO’s reciprocal market 
opening is an antidote – and the areas where regulatory or other problems need to be 
remedied before the full benefits of liberalization can be reaped.  Even in the latter case, if the 
time frame for reform could be predicted, a government would be in a position to decide 
whether to pre-commit in the WTO to future liberalization, in order to lend credibility to the 
reform program and/or to obtain a negotiating benefit. 
•  More policy research to help design reform programs 
Negotiating deadlines create a desirable sense of urgency about the need to find solution to 
reform problems, but negotiating pressure alone is hardly likely to produce the best 
responses.   25
…No country can participate meaningfully in international services negotiations without 
understanding how domestic reform is best implemented.  Developing countries in particular 
could benefit from the experience of other countries on these issues…. 
Genuine ownership and understanding of reform strategies can…only come through active 
engagement by national stakeholders informed by independent research.  …A stock-taking 
exercise to consider national and cross-country experience with services reform could do 
much to identify the areas where there is little reason to defer market-opening and those 
where there is significant uncertainty and a consequent need to temper negotiating demands. 
•  More technical support and resources to improve the regulatory environment 
…it is clear that improved regulation – ranging from prudential regulation in financial 
services to pro-competitive regulation in a variety of network-based services – will be critical 
to realizing the benefits of service liberalization.  Policy intervention will also be necessary to 
ensure universal service because liberalization will not always deliver adequate access to the 
poor.  …a link may need to be established between any market-opening negotiated at the 
WTO and additional assistance for the complementary reform that is vital for successful 
liberalization…. 
•  More political support to deliver improved access to foreign markets – for its own sake, 
but also because it will facilitate further domestic reform 
As developing countries seek improved access for their exports, they must determine the 
appropriate approach to international negotiations, and choose in particular between two 
alternatives.  One is a bilateral request-and-offer approach, the other is the use of generally 
applicable negotiating formulae or market schedules.  ..it may be possible to develop 
formulae or market schedules for concerted or more coordinated approaches to liberalization, 
such that WTO Members end up making more far-reaching commitments….There seem to be 
four broad reasons to favor formulae/model schedules: 
  First, in a world of unequal bargaining power multilaterally agreed formulae that must be 
seen to be equitable and efficient are likely to produce a more favorable outcome for the 
weaker party than bilateral negotiations. 
  Second, formulae help reduce the transactions costs of negotiations – avoiding the need 
to barter commitments sector-by-sector, country-by-country.  … 
  Third, formulae can help overcome the free-rider problem that arises in negotiations 
conducted under an MFN-based system.   … 
  Finally, the use of multilaterally applied formulae is perhaps the only way of granting 
credit to unilateral liberalizers.” 
  The foregoing priorities for services liberalization have been put in the context of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) multilateral negotiations that are currently underway.  My  reason  for 
doing so is because multilateral negotiations provide opportunities for realization of the greatest 
economic benefits for all WTO member countries, far greater than may stem from the negotiation of   26
regional and bilateral FTAs that are receiving so much attention in the Western Hemisphere and 
elsewhere.  In order for the DDA negotiations to succeed, the WTO members must act decisively to 
facilitate reciprocal liberalization, including possible linkages and tradeoffs across goods and services 
and within these categories.  Governments must face up politically to counteract protectionism 
domestically and, through the pursuit of reciprocal liberalization, seek to mobilize their export 
interests in support of multilateralism.  Much needs to be done to identify and measure the extant 
barriers to trade especially in services because of the complexities of these barriers and to design 
measures of regulatory reform of services that will complement and reinforce the liberalization 
process.   27
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Table 1 










Mode 1  Commercial services (excl. travel)  972  41.0 
Mode 2  Travel/Tourism  463  19.5 
Mode 3  Gross output of foreign affiliates  896  37.8 
Mode 4  Compensation of Employees  41  1.7 
Total   2,372  100.0 
aModes 1, 2, and 4 are derived from balance-of-payments accounts.  Mode 3 is derived 
from data on the operations of foreign affiliates in host countries. 
Source:  Chadha (2003, p. 70). 
 
 Table 2 
Exports of Merchandise and Commercial Services
a, 1980-2003 
(Millions of US dollars at current prices) 
               
          1980 1990 1995 2003
      Merchandise Services Merchandise Services Merchandise Services Merchandise Services
Andean  Economies                30,466 3,048 31,133 4,024 39,495 5,073 52,887 5,229
Bolivia  942                80 926 133 1,100 174 1,573 266
Colombia                  3,924 1,294 6,766 1,548 10,056 1,641 12,671 1,724
Ecuador                  2,481 348 2,714 508 4,307 687 6,039 889
Peru  3,898                663 3,230 714 5,575 1,042 8,954 1,560
Venezuela                  19,221 663 17,497 1,121 18,457 1,529 23,650 790
Other L.A Economies  79,269  14,460  115,532  25,577  189,024  39,024  324,716  55,402 
                    
United  States                225,566 38,110 393,592 132,880 584,743 198,501 723,805 287,695
European Union (15)
b              689,293 179,581 1,391,092 344,710 1,905,478 472,841 2,900,735 822,839
Japan  130,441                18,760 287,581 41,384 443,116 63,966 471,817 70,624
                    
Rest of the World  988,837  126,886 1,376,482  262,654 2,228,315  452,128  3,406,576  615,331 
                    
Total          2,034,137 363,337 3,448,747 781,628 5,161,652 1,187,436 7,502,933 1,796,489
             
a. Include transportation , travel, and other services.        
          
    
   
b. Partly estimated for 1980 and 1990 
Source: WTO Statistics Database [http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm]. Table 3 
Imports of Merchandise and Commercial Services, 1980-2003 
(Millions of US dollars at current prices) 
               
      1980 1990  1995 2003
    Merchandise Services Merchandise Services Merchandise Services  Merchandise Services
Andean  Economies                22,057 7,059 18,107 6,189 39,662 10,721 39,815 10,795
Bolivia  665                238 687 291 1,424 321 1,613 535
Colombia                  4,739 1,134 5,590 1,683 13,853 2,824 13,892 3,232
Ecuador                  2,253 661 1,861 755 4,152 1,141 6,534 1,467
Peru      2,573 825  2,634  1,070  7,584  1,781  8,470  2,484
Venezuela    11,827  4,201  7,335  2,390  12,649  4,654  9,306  3,077
Other L.A Economies  101,391  21,485  111,344  28,794  212,803  43,355  326,208  57,044 
                 
United  States                  256,984 28,890 516,987 97,950 770,852 129,108 1,303,050 228,535
European Union (15)  775,138  158,693 1,438,333  330,572 1,822,802  468,266  2,811,923  794,289 
Japan  141,296                32,100 235,368 84,281 335,882 121,548 382,930 110,263
                    
Rest of the World  901,666  180,165 1,359,002  308,758 2,349,342  482,233  3,280,226  649,280 
                    
Total          2,075,084 399,848 3,549,690 821,561 5,278,878 1,201,155 7,778,129 1,782,367
             
Source: See Table 1.             Table 4 
Trade in Transportation Services, 1980-2003 
(Millions of US dollars at current prices) 
            
        1980 1990 1995 2003
          Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Andean  Economies                  1,082 2,758 1,542 2,347 1,887 4,221 1,680 4,469
Bolivia  29                138 48 179 78 211 83 276
Colombia                  418 530 484 588 565 1,191 634 1,260
Ecuador                  129 254 242 314 322 484 342 635
Peru  221                487 310 465 338 905 296 978
Venezuela                  285 1,349 458 801 584 1,430 325 1,320
Other L.A Economies  3,911  9,518  5,998  10,557  8,688  18,214  10,378  15,236 
                
United  States                14,240 15,380 37,330 35,510 44,999 41,713 47,526 65,725
European Union (15)  55,086  55,436  82,025  87,219  106,806  110,163  166,214  167,449 
Japan                  12,730 16,890 17,750 26,650 22,506 35,924 26,502 34,196
                
Rest of the World  47,542  68,424  78,575  100,270  118,140  150,837  154,089  197,473 
                
Total                  134,591 168,406 223,220 262,553 303,026 361,072 406,389 484,548
          
Source: See Table 1.          Table 5 
Trade in Travel Services, 1980-2003 
(Millions of US dollars at current prices) 
            
        1980 1990 1995 2003
          Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Andean  Economies                  1,181 2,629 1,365 2,007 2,244 3,172 2,538 2,898
Bolivia  36                55 58 60 55 48 90 90
Colombia                  478 240 406 454 657 878 813 1,024
Ecuador                  131 228 188 175 255 235 406 354
Peru  293                107 217 295 428 297 923 620
Venezuela                  243 1,999 496 1,023 849 1,714 306 810
Other  L.A  Economies                  6,725 6,801 14,427 10,383 20,311 12,934 30,551 15,290
                
United  States                  10,590 10,410 50,400 38,100 74,791 46,261 84,123 59,664
European  Union  (15)                  50,174 43,975 114,987 109,056 156,946 155,516 221,337 225,637
Japan  640                4,590 3,590 24,930 3,224 36,764 3,539 28,959
                   
Rest of the World  41,228  46,351  95,838  92,397  165,669  142,603  218,293  181,554 
                
Total                  102,632 105,326 264,815 264,483 400,630 381,144 527,292 495,814
          
Source: See Table 1.          Table 6 
Trade in Other Commercial Services, 1980-2003 
(Millions of US dollars at current prices) 
            
        1980 1990 1995 2003
          Exports Import Exports Import Exports Import Exports Import
Andean  Economies                  785 1,672 1,117 1,834 942 3,327 1,010 3,430
Bolivia  14                45 27 51 41 61 93 169
Colombia                  398 364 658 641 419 755 276 949
Ecuador                  88 179 78 266 110 422 141 478
Peru  149                231 187 310 276 579 341 887
Venezuela                  136 853 167 566 96 1,510 159 947
Other L.A Economies  3,825  5,167  5,153  7,855  10,026  12,208  14,475  26,516 
                          
United  States                  13,280 3,100 45,150 24,340 78,711 41,134 156,046 103,146
European  Union  (15)                  67,170 52,574 134,481 117,581 193,993 185,719 405,197 372,955
Japan  5,390                10,620 20,044 32,701 38,236 48,859 40,583 47,109
                          
Rest of the World  40,272  59,823  93,915  119,903  172,839  183,225  260,982  278,794 
                          
Total                  126,112 126,117 293,590 294,525 483,779 458,937 862,808 802,004
          
Source: See Table 1.          Table 7 
Gross Domestic Product 
                
            Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
            1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994  2002
Total Value
a 17,230 23,837 67,533 79,820 14,270  87,375 17,834 132,153 558,202 495,881
By  Economic  Sector,  %  of  GDP                
Agriculture  16.3                    14.6 13.9 14.0 19.7 7.7 8.2 9.3 5.4 2.6
Industry  34.2                    33.2 36.0 30.6 28.5 28.7 25.3 26.5 41.7 43.0
Manufactures                      18.8 14.7 20.5 15.9 15.9 10.7 16.2 14.6 17.6 …
Services                      49.5 52.2 50.1 55.4 51.8 63.6 57.3 54.6 52.9 54.4
GDP per capita
b   886.4  944.3  2,325.7 2,321.1 1,776.3  1,812.3 2,115.1 2,437.7 3,482.0 2,654.8
GDP per capita
c 2,053.7 2,214.5 5,761.8 5,899.5 3,085.2  3,984.6 3,203.4 4,580.0 5,581.1 4,269.1
              
a. Millions of local currencies at constant prices            
            
           
            
    
      
b. Constant 1995 US$ 
3. PPP constant 1995 international $ 
 
Source: Andean Community Statistics: http://www.comunidadandina.org/estadisticas.asp    
World Bank Data and Statistics: http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html Table 8 
Population and Labor Force 
(Thousands) 
                
            Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
            1994  2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003
Population                      7,311 9,012 37,810 44,562 11,221 13,343 23,130 26,951 21,377 25,554
Labor  Force                      2,578 3,394 14,328 18,363 4,114 5,491 9,049 11,688 7,867 10,385
1,486                    2,223 10,313 14,102 2,484 3,659 6,343 8,553 6,893 9,340 Urban 
(58)                    (66) (72) (77) (60) (67) (70) (73) (88) (90)
1,092                    1,171 4,015 4,261 1,631 1,832 2,707 3,134 974 1,044 Rural 
(42)                    (34) (28) (23) (40) (33) (30) (27) (12) (10)
              
              
      
    
Note: numbers in parentheses indicate proportions of total labor force.
Source: Andean Community Statistics: http://www.comunidadandina.org/estadisticas.asp  Table 9 
Stock of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, 2003 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
 
 Bolivia  Colombia  Ecuador  Peru  Venezuela 
Total Inward FDI  6,730  19,063  11,240  12,745  34,241 
U.S. FDI  NA  2,751  1,446  2,659  10,859 
    Mining  NA  238  887  1,142  2,678 
    Utilities  NA  124  --  147  2,208 
    Manufacturing  NA  1,129  72  208  2,698 
    Services  NA  1,260  487  1,162  3,275 
 
NA – Not available. 
Sources:  UNCTAD, FDI Database [http://www.unctad.org] 






 Table 10 






















Restrictions on commercial presence 
Licensing of banks  Yes  0.200  Yes  0.190 
  Based inversely on the maximum number of new 
banking licenses issued with only prudential 
requirements 
     
Direct investment  Yes  0.200  Yes  0.190 
  Based inversely on the maximum equity participation 
permitted in an existing domestic bank 
     
Joint venture arrangements  Yes  0.100  No  n.a. 
  New bank entry only through joint venture with a 
domestic bank 
     
Movement of people  Yes  0.020  No  n.a. 
  Based inversely on years that executives, specialists 
and/or senior managers can stay 
     
        
Other restrictions         
Raising funds by banks  Yes  0.100  Yes  0.143 
  Banks are restricted from accepting deposits from the 
public and/or raising funds from domestic capital 
markets 
     
Lending funds by banks  Yes  0.100  Yes  0.143 
  Banks are restricted in types or sizes of loans and/or are 
directed to lend to housing and small business 
     
Other business of banks – insurance and securities services  Yes  0.200  Yes  0.095 
  Banks are excluded from insurance and/or securities 
services 
     
Expanding the number of banking outlets  Yes  0.050  Yes  0.048 
  Based inversely on the number of outlets permitted.         
Composition of the board of directors  Yes  0.020  No  n.a. 
  Based inversely on the percentage of the board that can 
comprise foreigners 
     
Temporary movement of people  Yes  0.010  No  n.a. 
  Based inversely on the number of days temporary entry 
permitted to executives, specialists and/or senior 
managers  
     
        
Total weighting or highest possible score    1.000    0.808 
 
Source:  McGuire and Schuele (2000), Tables 12.1 and 12.3, pp. 204-05, 208.  
Table 11 
Barriers to FDI 
 
Restrictions on market entry  Bans on foreign investment in certain sectors 
  Quantitative restrictions (e.g., limit of 25 per cent foreign ownership 
in a sector) 
  Screening and approval (sometimes involving national interest or net 
economic benefits tests) 
  Restrictions on the legal form of the foreign entity 
  Minimum capital requirements 
  Conditions on subsequent investment 
  Conditions on location 
  Admission taxes 
   
Ownership and control   Compulsory joint ventures with domestic investors 
restrictions  Limits on the number of foreign board members 
  Government appointed board members 
  Government approval required for certain decisions 
  Restrictions on foreign shareholders’ rights 
  Mandatory transfer of some ownership to locals within a specified 
time (e.g., 15 years) 
   
Operational restrictions  Performance requirements (e.g., export requirements) 
  Local content restrictions 
  Restrictions on imports of labor, capital and raw materials 
  Operational permits or licences 
  Ceilings on royalties 
  Restrictions on repatriation of capital and profits 
 




Constructed Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalent “Guesstimates” by 1-Digit ISIC Services 


























Australia 12.0  7.4  183.4  24.8  25.4 
Austria  5.0  4.6 98.7 20.1  13.9 
Canada   6.0  9.0  117.7  25.9  40.2 
Chile 40.0  34.4  182.2 45.2  42.9 
European 
Union 
10.0 10.0  182.0  27.2  23.6 
Finland 19.0 14.6  181.0  23.8  31.7 
Hong Kong  32.0  31.5  149.8  39.0  42.9 
Japan 5.0  4.6  142.0  28.9  32.3 
Korea 16.0  21.4 164.9  36.3  40.7 
Mexico 24.0 21.3  152.3  40.9  29.8 
New Zealand  5.0  13.4  181.5  30.5  36.1 
Norway 5.0  13.4  122.2  25.7 24.0 
Singapore 12.0  34.4  138.8  35.9  33.7 
Sweden 12.0 13.4  184.2  22.5  26.9 
Switzerland 5.0  8.0  178.1  27.7  32.3 
Turkey  5.0  34.4 31.6 35.4  35.9 
United States  5.0  4.6  111.4  21.7  31.7 
 
Source: Hoekman (1995, pp. 355-56).  
Table 13 
Tariff Equivalents of Barriers to Telecommunication 
Services in Major Nations 
(Percentage) 
 
 Domestic  Foreign 
Australia 0.31  0.31 
Austria 0.85  0.85 
Belgium 0.65  1.31 
Brazil 3.81  5.68 
Canada 1.07  3.37 
Chile 1.68  1.68 
Denmark 0.20  0.20 
Finland 0.00  0.00 
France 0.34  1.43 
Germany 0.32  0.32 
Hong Kong  1.26  1.26 
Ireland 1.46  2.67 
Italy 1.00  1.00 
Japan 0.26  0.26 
Korea 4.30  8.43 
Mexico 6.24  14.43 
Netherlands 0.20  0.20 
New Zealand  0.27  0.27 
Singapore 2.10  2.72 
Spain 2.03  3.93 
Sweden 0.65  0.65 
Switzerland 1.23  1.23 
Turkey 19.59  33.53 
United Kingdom  0.00  0.00 
United States  0.20  0.20 
Source:  Adapted from Warren (2000). 
  
Table 14 
Estimated Tariff Equivalents in Traded Services: 










+ 8.2  9.8 
Western Europe  8.5  18.3 
Australia and New Zealand  6.9  24.4 
Japan 19.7  29.7 
China 18.8  40.9 
Taiwan 2.6  5.3 
Other Newly Industrialized Countries  2.1  10.3 
Indonesia1 6.8  9.6 
Other South East Asia  5.0  17.7 
India 13.1  61.6 
Other South Asia
* 20.4  46.3 
Brazil 35.7  57.2 
Other Latin America  4.7  26.0 
Turkey* 20.4  46.3 
Other Middle East and North Africa  4.0  9.5 
CEECs & Russia  18.4  51.9 
South Africa  15.7  42.1 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  0.3  11.1 
Rest of World (ROW)  20.4  46.3 
 
*Turkey and Other South Asia are not available, separately, in the U.S. data, and have 
been assigned estimated ROW values. 
+North America values involve assigning Canada/Mexico numbers to the United States. 





 Table 15 
Average Gross Operating Margins of Firms Listed on National 
Stock Exchanges, 1994-96 by Country/Region 
(Percentage) 
 
Country/Region Agriculture Manufacturing  Services 
Australia 8.4  15.5  16.6 
Canada 32.1  22.6  32.9 
Chile 39.1  40.8  44.0 
China 30.6  28.1  49.5 
European Union  22.9  23.8  31.6 
Hong Kong  25.9  12.8  18.1 
Indonesia 41.8  34.3  41.3 
Japan 38.4  26.4  28.7 
Republic of Korea  11.2  25.7  25.8 
Malaysia 22.6  6.0  21.6 
Mexico 38.4  39.3  37.2 
New Zealand  33.3  16.6  26.8 
Philippines 18.1  28.6  42.3 
Singapore 0.0  11.1  22.0 
Taiwan 19.6  25.1  41.3 
Thailand 38.2  27.3  52.6 
United States  36.6  21.2  42.3 
Rest of Cairns Group
a 36.3  31.1  39.0 
a Includes Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia. 
Source:  Hoekman (2000). Based on calculations using Disclosure, 
Worldscope (1998) data. 
 Table 16 
Average Gross Operating Margins of Services Firms Listed on 
National Stock Exchanges, 1994-96, by Country/Region and by Sector 
(Percentage) 
 
Country/Region            Recreation
Business





Australia 17.9        13.8  15.3 7.0 41.0  b  27.3  7.9  9.1 c
 
Canada               60.1 51.7 14.4 19.2 44.5  2.3  67.8  12.0 16.0 36.5
Chile                  b b 68.7 b 55.2  b  b 21.3 27.9 46.8
China                b b 45.9 67.1 34.0  b  77.5  24.4 25.5 46.9
European Union  42.5  32.1  19.3  22.1  51.6  22.3  23.7  23.6  19.9  32.6 
Hong Kong  b  6.5  12.9  11.5  25.4  b  31.3  10.1  6.9  31.0 
Indonesia                b 81.1 22.9 25.3 53.6  b  68.2 26.4 24.8 45.3
Japan                      28.1 31.6 14.2 28.6 40.5 40.1  27.2 32.9 15.6 20.6
Republic of 
Korea                b 41.2  15.3 b b  b  b 26.7 14.9 31.2
Malaysia                  13.3 c
  18.3 14.7 28.3 24.3  38.7 11.2 10.8 30.7
Mexico               19.6 b 25.7 37.3 33.3  b  49.6  28.4 25.0 51.0
New Zealand  b  b  13.8  b  57.6  b  26.9  6.6  19.7  35.6 
Philippines                     19.9 b 40.2 b 53.9 b 55.8 43.9 40.3 42.3
Singapore                 46.7 8.6 10.6 7.7 46.3  29.2  28.2 5.4 7.9 28.0
Taiwan               79.9 36.3 21.6 11.1 64.8  b  74.5  21.5 23.2 38.9
Thailand                85.4 35.8 38.1 c 60.3  40.6  55.5 44.2 25.6 56.7
United States  46.8  56.2  20.2  c  56.3  37.0  48.5  34.6  27.0  43.4 
Other Cairns
a                    b b 28.9 26.2 69.8 29.3  64.6 24.2 22.9 52.4
a Includes Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia. 
b Data not available. 
c Reflects negative gross operating margin. 
Source:  Hoekman (2000).  Based on calculations using Disclosure, Worldscope (1998) data.  
Table 17.  Computation of Welfare Effects of Bilateral FTAs, Unilateral Free Trade, and Global Free Trade (Billions of Dollars and Percent)   
                                    
Bilateral Free Trade       Unilateral Free Trade       Global Free Trade        
US-CAC  Welfare                United States  Welfare   Welfare
   (U.S.$)  (% of GNP)       (U.S.$)  (% of GNP)   
Agricultural 
Protection 
(U.S.$)        (%  of  GNP)
United States  17.3   0.2    United States  320.2  3.2    United States  0.4  0.0     
CAC                         5.3 4.4 Global 507.0   CAC 0.5 0.4
Global  15.7        CAC  Welfare              Australia -0.1 0.0
US-Australia  Welfare         (U.S.$)  (% of GNP)    Morocco  0.4  0.8     
   (U.S.$)  (% of GNP)    CAC  6.2  5.1    Global  53.9        
United States  19.4   0.2    Global                33.7   Welfare
Australia                   5.4 1.1    Australia  Welfare
Manufactures 
Tariffs 
(U.S.$) (%  of  GNP)
Global  23.1           (U.S.$)  (% of GNP)    United States  75.7  0.8     
US-Morocco  Welfare                     Australia 4.6 0.9 CAC 7.7 6.5
   (U.S.$)  (% of GNP)    Global  19.3       Australia  11.2  2.2     
United States  6.0   0.1    Morocco  Welfare              Morocco 1.9 4.4
Morocco  0.9   2.0       (U.S.$)  (% of GNP)    Global  701.6        
Global  7.5        Morocco  1.6  3.5    Welfare       
                         Global 11.4
Services Barriers 
(U.S.$) (%  of  GNP)
                          United States 466.4 4.6
                        CAC 9.5 8.0
                        Australia 19.0 3.8
                        Morocco 2.5 5.7
                          Global 1,661.8                   
                     
                   
  Total  Welfare
(U.S.$) (%  of  GNP)
  United  States 542.5 5.4 
                      CAC 17.7 14.8 
                      Australia 30.1 6.0 
                      Morocco 4.8 10.9 
                        Global  2,417.3        
                      
Source:  Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2005). Figure 1 




Note:  The higher the score the more restrictive an economy; scores range from 0 to 1. 
Source:  McGuire and Schuele (2000, p. 211) Figure 2 




Note:  The higher the score the more restrictive an economy; scores range from 0 to 1. 
Source:  McGuire and Schuele (2000, p. 211) 
 
 